I don't think it's that simple. The Amiga was not a business machine, period. It couldn't compete with the IBM PC for a whole bunch of reasons - so Commodore had the choice to either ignore that market, or try to sell a different machine to this particular market. This is not much different from selling the C64 alongside the Amiga: C64 for the entry level consumer market, Amiga for the high end consumer market and 'Multimedia' work, PC for the traditional business market.
Commodore Germany - who came up with the whole "Commodore PC" concept - actually made a ton of money selling PCs in the eighties, while also being the biggest or 2nd biggest (after the UK) Amiga and C64 market. If you read Commodore Germany's flyers from the late eighties, they're advertising the C64, the Amiga line, a whole range of PCs and even Unix servers (they were an official SCO Unix distributor for a few years) and it all sort of makes sense - because the message was: "whatever your needs, we got the right system for you."
The problem is that Commodore fucked up all three markets. They never came up with a proper follow-up to the C64 for the low level consumer market, which is why Nintendo killed them in the US. They completely mishandled the Amiga, and they had no idea how to stay profitable in the PC market once it became ultra-competitive.
There's a quote from David Pleasance in Bagnall's "The Final Years". He visited West Chester's engineering division in early 1993 and allegedly saw "seven Amiga engineers and 40 PC Engineers" - that's just stupid.