Discussing strategy of parties involved in the amiga-market (Hardware/OS)

[agami]

Last time I checked this is a user forum where personal opinions can be freely expressed, as long as it's not libel and/or using language and demeanor that is malicious in intent.

If you feel this latest thread is yet another in a long line of "waste of time" discussions about something that cannot be changed; it is your prerogative to think that way but you should not really be upset because no one is forcing you to read them.

Also, so far no one in this thread has advised against or stopped anyone from purchasing a x1000. By all means, everyone buy as many x1000's as you can afford, have one at home and one at the holiday house. No one is questioning how you choose to spend your money.

I agree with OlafS3 in having this discussion in this forum. It's not like there's much else to talk about. You want to block your ears and go LA LA LA LA LA NOT LISTENING, again that's your prerogative.

[agami]

Here's my analysis:

Every new business playing in an existing market, or creating a new market, and the Distribution of Innovation follow the same curve. They all invariably face what is referred to as The Chasm; A point at which the ideology and the business practices that got it off the ground need to change in order to gain a firm foothold for continued growth. This is also sometimes referred to as The Tipping Point.



The Hi-Toro guys got past The Chasm by having Commodore acquire them.

For Escom it made sense to buy into the Amiga market even though the Amiga business was flawed. Through it's wholly owned subsidiary Amiga Technologies they had their own plans to change this. Alas Escom had its own troubles and eventually went belly-up.

Escom/Amiga Technologies were continuing an existing business with an existing line of products so there was no Chasm to face.

Gateway also no doubt considered the deal they got was a good one. A diminished but still substantial Amiga market mostly carried by the 3rd parties and the loyal community, and a business that had some nice IP that would fit into their Multimedia strategy. Piggy-backing on top of the Amiga market time meant that they would not need to face the Chasm, or at least when they did it would be easy to traverse as they are not starting from the ground. In the late '90s you could still sell the Amiga as a turn-key business.

This brings me to today and the issues I have with A-Eon's strategy or, dare I say, the apparent lack there of.

Unfortunately things are not so simple for A-Eon. Most of the 3rd parties are gone, most of the development community is gone and therefore most of the users are gone. The market has also fragmented itself with the rise of MorphOS and AROS.

All the signals they have been sending out since their inception is that of a business that believes it is building atop an existing market and therefore can avoid The Chasm. In reality, A-Eon are starting from the ground and are building up a new business and will inevitably face The Chasm. What concerns me is that there is nothing in their displayed behaviour, both direct and indirect, that leads me to believe that they will be able to traverse it. A couple of thousand Amiga loyalists with large sums of discretionary income may get them up to The Chasm, but it's going to take a lot more than that, even if it just modest growth.